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IDOLATRY OF LAND 
Georgette Chapman Poindexter''· 
Woe to those who join house to house, 
who add field to field, 
until there is no more room, 
and you are made to dwell alone 
in the midst of the land. 
Isaiah 5:8 
In his essay 'Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine and the American 
Wilderness' ,1 WJ. T. Mitchell explores what he terms the 'paradoxical 
relation between landscape and idolatry'. Defining idolatry as a false god 
that displaces the true one with a material image, Mitchell contends that 
extreme Zionism has transformed the landscape of Israel into an idol 
where the visible and unrepresentable God is made visible and material. 2 
He asserts that landscape here stands for more than ideology. As an idol 
it condenses ideology into a potent stereotype for mass consumption-
an idolatry of place.3 
It is from this springboard I wish to jump in discussing what I will term 
an idolatry of land. Just as the 'place' of Israel is idolized in Zionism, pri-
vate ownership of land can be idolized in the United States. Cultural 
norms threaten to transform home and hearth into a visible and mater-
ial idol. The idolatry of land by the landowners evidences itself in richly 
textured social patterns. From meticulous attention to lawn and 
flowerbed (the deity of the ride-on mower) to joining forces with former 
adversaries such as environmentalists to promote legislation limiting 
sprawl (the deity of open space), landowners worship their plots. 
However, culture cannot stand alone in encouraging idolatry. Property 
ownership cuts into the legalities of constitutional, property, or contract 
rights. Legal rights in the USA can reinforce the importance of private 
land ownership. The right to own real property free from governmental 
interference stands as a basic constitutional privilege in the United States. 
In this communal society, however, private property must co-exist with 
public interest. The question of what is, or is not, permissible govern-
mental land regulation creates a tension between private property rights 
,,. Many thanks go to Regina Austin, Genie Birch, Katie Day, and Todd Sinai for 
review of previous drafts of this chap. and to Wendy Vargas and Natalie Bucciarelli for 
their consistently excellent research assistance. 
1 W.J.T. Mitchell, 'Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness', 
Critical Inquiry, (2000) 26, 193. 
2 Ibid., at 219. 3 Ibid., at 205. 
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and public interest. Identification and resolution of this tension, in a 
manner to decrease the possibility of idolatry, are the focus of this 
chapter. 
This chapter will explore the idolatry of land from several vantage 
points. First the religious significance of idolatry will be discussed. Far 
more than an admonition of graven images, the biblical definition and 
proscription of idolatry extend to the worship of land. I will draw upon 
the work of theologians and biblical scholars who have written exten-
sively on the religious prohibitions of land worship. Working from the 
basis that land is a gift to be shared, not dominated, idolatry can be 
avoided by instilling the values of neighbourliness and limiting private 
control. 
Next I will turn to how the legal system in the United States facilitates 
(if not encourages) such idolatry. Private property rights are vehicles of 
wealth creation in a capitalist nation, and owning a home is a primary 
path to wealth accumulation. 4 As compared with other material posses-
sions, land ownership has a special legal status that gives rise to the 
possibility of idolatry.5 
In this chapter I will examine ways in which idolatry manifests itself in 
modern US land use law. One example is the multiplicity of local govern-
ments all with duplicative powers exercised over very small jurisdictions. 
Another illustration is the work of so-called 'property rights' proponents 
who seek severely to limit (if not deny) the right of the government to reg-
ulate land. These topics are unified in a discussion of the anti-sprawl 
movement that seeks to limit growth in suburban areas. While on the face 
of it this is an environmental issue, current suburban landowners are 
major forces in promoting the legislation for selfish reasons. The land 
that they worship, their home, is threatened by ever-increasing develop-
ment. Having 'gotten' their land, their goal is to maintain the status quo 
without development that threatens the image of heaven they have 
crafted for themselves. 
4 R.K. Schuster, 'Lending Discrimination: Is the Secondary Market Helping to Make 
the "American Dream" a Reality?' (2000-1) 36 Gonz. L Rev. 153, 154. See also, 
R. Briffault, 'Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theory' (1990) 90 Colum. L 
Rev. 346, 438 ('suburban zoning makes it more difficult for less affluent people to buy 
homes, thereby restricting their access to the major source of wealth and equity appreci-
ation available to most Americans and reinforcing the wealth differences between home-
owners and non-owners'). 
5 e.g., strict due-process rules on dispossession' (foreclosure), registration require-
ments, etc. 
r 
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Idolatry 
The commandment against idolatry6 is of great importance for biblical 
ethics.7 A false god that displaces the true one with a material image 
leads inexorably to the violation of every commandment. 8 While the idea 
of idolatry conjures up an image of the film 'The Ten Commandments' 
with Edward G. Robinson cavorting with a golden calf, in reality the bible 
contains numerous proscriptions on Man's desire to control and own 
land. For example, Leviticus warns that Man cannot own land; it belongs 
to a higher power and we are but 'strangers and sojourners' in the land.9 
According to the Bible, above all, land is a gift from God. The Bible views 
this gift: (1) as the basis for communal interaction and (2) as the basis of 
power. 
LAND AS A COMMUNAL GIFT 
The gift of the land of Israel is conditioned on a promise of neighbourli-
ness. Walter Brueggemann notes that in biblical Israel Man resolved to 
keep the condition and accept the land on the terms of the covenant. 10 
This covenant of neighbourliness will be reconsidered as we examine the 
relative rights among and between landowners in modern US society. 
Explicit in the gift of land in the Bible is the willingness to share with oth-
ers. This runs counter to some notions of private property rights in the 
USA and other countries. 
Just as Moses faced issues of social relationships in Deuteronomy, 11 we 
confront our social covenant with land today. According to one biblical 
scholar, 'either the neighbour is honoured, respected and cared for in 
terms of social policy and social practice, or deep human losses and 
pathologies arise that threaten us all. As Moses understood so well, there 
is no escape from this either/or, not by might, not by wealth, not by 
technological sophistication.' 12 In this interpretation, land is a social 
contract, not a one-dimensional piece of real estate. If we strip away the 
social aspect we lose the covenant that underlies the gift of ownership. 
6 In discussing idolatry I certainly do not hold myself out as a biblical scholar. This 
section serves to introduce the notion that attachment to land can be deeply rooted in the 
Judaeo-Christian belief system. 
7 W. Harrelson, 'Decalogue' in J. Childress and J. Macquarrie (eds.), The 
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Westminster, 1967) at 146. 
8 See Matt 22:37. Idolatry is one sin God will not forgive. The others, killing, steal-
ing lying, are concerned with people's relations with one another and can be justified by 
God. Idolatry is a sin against God and is an absolute crime: n. 1 above, at 219. 
9 
'The land shall not be sold in perpetuity, for the land is mine; for you are strangers 
and sojourners with me. And in all the country you possess, you shall grant a redemption 
of the land' Lev. 25:23-24 RSV. 
10 W. Brueggemann, The Covenanted Self (Minneapolis, Minn., 1999) at 105. 
11 Ibid., at 105. 12 Ibid., at 106. 
------~ --- - ---- ~ 
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The consequence of breaking the covenant of neighbourliness transforms 
property ownership into idolatry. 
CONTROL OF THE LAND 
The Bible also cautions us about equating power with control of land. 
Power based upon ownership of land tempts us to forget the biblical 
admonition that land is a gift. 13 A claim of ownership brings with it the 
power to exclude, the power to sell, the power to control. 14 'Those who 
claim or aspire to power ... tend to be those who claim the right to own 
or control land.'15 Brueggeman contends that to reconcile this contra-
diction requires a biblically legitimate form of land management that is 
consistent with the condition of land as a gift. 16 
Whether manifest as an imperialistic idolatry (taking land as your 
own) or a boundary idolatry (excluding others from your land), an 
unchecked power to control land disregards the concept of land as a gift. 
The legal fiction of terra nullius (a land without inhabitants) empowered 
colonial imperialists to claim land as their own.17 In modern times, even 
though imperialistic idolatry has fallen into disfavour, boundary idolatry 
remains in the USA, forcing a confrontation with the same tensions as in 
ancient Israel. The theological promise of the gift is juxtaposed against 
the practical reality of control and power to exclude. 18 
When the legal structure encourages self-determinative control over 
land, landowners begin to consider land not as a gift from god but rather 
a right purchased from the State. As this control evolves into a funda-
mental principle of law (the right to own one's home free from govern-
mental or third-party intrusion) it is easy to see how home and hearth 
13 W. Brueggemann, The Land (Philadelphia, Penn., 1977) at 61. 'Torah exists so that 
Israel will not forget whose land it is and how it was given to use. Only the landed are 
tempted to forget.' 
14 Consider the confrontation between Ahab and Na both in 1 Kings 21. Ahab regards 
land as a tradeable commodity thinking that everything (including land) can be bought, 
sold, traded, and conquered.Na both regards the land as an inalienable gift. For more dis-
cussion of this passage see Brueggemann, n. 13 above, at 93. 
15 N.C. Habel, This Land is Mine (Minneapolis, Minn., 1995), at 142. 
16 Brueggemann, n. 13 above, at 74. 
17 Habel, n. 15 above, at 3. There is an abundance of legal scholarship on the topic of 
terra nullius. See, generally, J. T. Gathii, 'Neoliberalism, Colonialism and International 
Governance: Decentering the International Law of Governmental Legitimacy' (2000) 98 
Michigan Law Review 1996; A. Berman, 'The Noumea Accords: Emancipation or 
Colonial Harness?' (2001) 36 Texas International Law Journal 277,283 (noting the doc-
trine has been universally condemned). For a discussion of this doctrine in Australian law 
see B.A. Keon-Cohen, 'The Mabo Litigation: A Personal and Procedural Account' (2000) 
24 Melbourne University Law R'eview 893. For a discussion of the doctrine in Asian colo-
nialism see W.B. Heflin, 'Diayou/Senkaku Islands Dispute: Japan and China, Oceans 
Apart' (2000) 1 Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal l, 6. See also S. Whatmore, 'De/Re-
Territorializing Possession', in this vol. 
18 Brueggemann, n. 10 above, 100. 
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can become material idols. Idolatry of land presents problems that 
stretch wider than theology. For example, private control and exclusivity 
threaten to remove environmental issues from public discourse. It may 
also exacerbate negative externalities that arise when political jurisdic-
tions can close themselves off from the wider regional community. 
The next step in the examination of the idolatry of land in the United 
States is how the legal system in the USA defines and limits self-determi-
native exclusive control over land. The crux of the analysis will be to dis-
cern whether the legal structure facilitates idolatry by abdicating control 
(power) and exclusivity (neighbourliness) to private/individual interests. 
Although there are countless ways in which to dissect this theme I have 
chosen three broad areas for discussion: zoning, the property rights 
movement, and sprawl. 
Zoning 
If forced to select one word to describe the US system of zoning (the reg-
ulation of the use and the intensity of use of land), the choice is clear: 
fragmented. The fragmentation of the metropolitan area is distinctly 
American with deep historical roots. 19 Each state grants local govern-
ments the right to enact zoning regulations. As a result, the nation's more 
than 39,000 local governments each has its own set of zoning laws.20 
This system stemmed from the early years of American independence 
when distrust of central government coupled with a desire to bring 
government closer to the people. Leaders such as Thomas Jefferson advo-
cated fragmented, decentralized, local governments.21 The hope was that 
the local landowners would control these decentralized governments 
more intimately than central government.22 This shift replaced the 
English feudal system of tenure (the right to occupy) as the central pre-
miss of land law. Land ownership became the principle from which US 
real property law evolves.23 
19 For a discussion of the uniqueness of the US system see G.R. Weiher, The Fractured 
Metropolis: Political Fragmentation and Metropolitan Segregation (Albany, NY, 1991) 
at 165. 
20 In 1997 there were 19,372 municipal governments and 16,629 towns/townships: 
1997 Census of Governments. Vol. 1, Government Organization (US Census Bureau, 
issued Aug. 1999). Table 3-Local Governments and Public School Systems by Type and 
State: 1997. 
21 Alexis de Tocqueville traced this preference for a decentralized government to pre-
Revolutionary times. In a society where revolution is preceded by a relatively egalitarian 
State, there is a desire for a more decentralized government. See A. de Tocqueville, 
Democracy in America (R.D. Heffner (ed.), New York, 1956) at 297. For a more in-depth 
analysis of this point see G.C. Poindexter, 'Collective Individualism: Deconstructing the 
Legal City' (1997) 145 U Pa. L Rev. 607,624. 
22 R. Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson (Lawrence, Kansas, 1984) 
at 82. 
23 See D. Thomas, 'Anglo American Land Law', Part III, (1999) 34 Real Prop. Probate 
& Trust]. 443, 449 for analysis of tenure versus ownership. In his comparison of US and 
i 
r. 
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Decentralized local government concentrates zoning decisions in the 
hands of locally elected officials. Fragmentation of local government 
hands the reins of control to landowners, not to a far off (politically and 
geographically) central government.24 Since zoning control is so 
intensely local, it encourages dominance of self-interest rather than the 
interest of the wider community. Nowhere is this practice more evident 
than in the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) syndrome. For example many 
municipalities 'zone out' or do not permit undesirable land uses (heavy 
industrial, waste facilities, low-income housing). The suburban munici-
palities engage in a conscious parallelism25 to exclude and promote dis-
junctive land-use decisions that serve only the needs of the local residents 
and discourage co-ordinated regional planning.26 
Fragmented local government encourages identification of self with 
place, integrating the value of place with self-value. The 'right' address, 
the 'right' town, identifies an individual's place in society.27 Using an olive 
tree as a metaphor for spatial identification, author Thomas Friedman 
comments: 
Olive trees are important. They represent everything that roots us, anchors us, 
identifies us and locates us in the world .... Olive trees are what give us the 
warmth of family, the joy of individuality .... We fight so intensely at times over 
UK land-use law, John Delafons notes that as the great leasehold estates were broken up 
after the Revolution, 'freehold land ownership became the accepted right of the citizen': 
J. Delafons, Land Use Controls in the United States (Cambridge, Mass., 1969) at 16. 
24 Note that this is in contrast to the British system of land-use planning and zoning 
where central government controls the process. The Town and Country Planning Act of 
1990 creates the structure of the planning system. The Secretary of State is charged with 
the duty of assuring consistency and continuity in the framing and execution of a 
national planning and land-use policy. Even regional zoning is elusive in the USA. I stress 
the differentiation between zoning regionally and planning regionally. Regional planning 
occurs often in coastal zone acts and other environmental overlays. Regional zoning is 
rare. The Model Municipal Planning Code has a section on Regional Planning which 
would permit, but certainly not require, co-operative zoning between municipalities. See, 
e.g. Chap. 30 of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code. Even regional planning, 
however, is not accepted as a universal truth. There is not consensus that state legisla-
tures should mandate regional planning. See B.W. Ohm, 'Reforming Land Planning 
Legislation at the Dawn of the 21st Century' (2000) 32 Urban Lawyer 181, 183. 
25 The term conscious parallelism comes from antitrust doctrine. It refers to the unco-
ordinated, but identical, pricing decisions of competitors through tacit agreements. See 
R. Frieden, 'Does a Hierarchical Internet Necessitate Multilateral Intervention?' (2001) 
26 North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation 361,387; 
R.A. Cass and K.N. Hylton, 'Antitrust Intent' (2001) 74 Southern California Law Review 
657, 669. Of course the opposite occurs when several local municipalities are vying to be 
chosen for the site of a desirable use. Because local taxes support local government, local 
governments are forced to offer similar packages to woo a prospective business. 
26 Furthermore, some commentators contend that this lack of co-ordinated planning 
encourages sprawl, a topic taken up later in this chap. For a discussion of the linkage 
between fragmentation and sprawl see E. Razin and M. Rosentraub, 'Are Fragmentation 
and Sprawl Interlinked?', Urban Affairs Review, (2000) 35, 821. 
27 See Poindexter, n. 21 above. 
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olive trees because, at their best, they provide the feelings of self esteem and 
belonging that are as essential for human survival as food in the belly.28 
However attractive local control and olive trees may be, though, when 
land-use decisions are so extraordinarily fragmented and isolated, they 
threaten to lose sight of the covenant of neighbourliness to those outside 
the delineated local boundaries. 29 The threat occurs when self-interested 
control over the land works to the detriment of those without power or 
control. 30 Local control permits citizens broad latitude to be both 
protectionist and isolationist, but fails to require internalization of the 
negative externalities of their zoning decisions.31 Forcing those without 
power to bear the negative burdens of local zoning decisions permits 
control to dominate over neighbourliness, and thus encourages idolatry 
of land. 
Property Rights 
Zoning, even when done at the level of government closest to the citi-
zenry, forces a tension between individual property rights and the police 
power of governmental regulation. When one considers the centrality of 
private property rights in the United States, the existence of any zoning 
statutes may be surprising.32 In fact, in many state constitutions the right 
to acquire, possess, and protect property stands along the traditional 
rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 33 If home-ownership 
is the cornerstone of the American Dream, private property rights have 
been called its essential foundation. 34 However, if one follows the 
doctrine of the property rights movement to its natural conclusion, it 
strips away the communal right in property in favour of the individual-
28 T.L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York, 2000) at 31. 
29 Friedman, ibid., notes the same danger: '[b]ut while olive trees are essential to our 
very being, an attachment to one's olive trees, when taken to excess, can lead us into forg-
ing identities, bonds and communities based on the exclusion of others': at 32. 
30 See Brueggemann, n. 13 above, at 65. 'The task for the landed is care for the brother 
and sister who have no standing ground in the community. They are without land and so 
without power.' 
31 An externality occurs when the actions of one person or institution may affect the 
welfare of another in ways that cannot be regulated by private agreements among 
the affected parties. E. Mills, Urban Economics (New York, NY, 1994), 167-8. This 
argument is prevalent in the discussion of municipal fair share for regional low-income 
housing begun in the Mount Laurel decisions: see Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernard, 
510 A 2d 621 (NJ 1986) ('Mount Laurel III'). The fair share concept was codified in New 
Jersey in the Fair Housing Act NJ Stat. Ann. 52:27D-301-329. 
32 One commentator even called land-use controls in the USA 'hardly more than an 
historical accident'. See, Delafons, n. 23 above, at 106. 
33 Ibid., at 23. 
34 C. Bolick, 'Subverting the American Dream; Government Dictated "Smart 
Growth" Is Unwise and Unconstitutional' (2000) 148 U Pa. L Rev. 859. 
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coming dangerously close to severing the covenant of neighbourliness 
and exalting the power of control. 
Property rights advocates promote two goals: (1) minimizing regula-
tion of property that reduces its value or restricts use and (2) ensuring 
that property owners will be compensated for loss in value due to 
regulation. 35 The movement epitomizes the aggressive individualism36 
that has come to romanticize the central role of private property in US 
land-use law. Opponents of the property rights movement charge that the 
inappropriate use of the takings clause does not promote property rights. 
Instead it promotes the rights of a few at the expense of the majority of 
property owners.37 
The issue is not whether private property rights exist in the USA. 
Clearly they do. But these rights function within the wider context of 
community and the public interest. The focus, then, should be on the ten-
sion between unfettered private property rights and the recognition of 
public interest in private property. It would be a mistake to approach this 
distinction from an all-or-nothing perspective. Property rights are correl-
ative; property law is the examination of the conflicts and resolutions 
between holders of different sets of rights within a piece of property.38 
Relevant for our discussion of idolatry is the tipping point on this 
continuum of private and public rights at which the covenant of land as a 
gift is broken. 
The epicentre of delineating private and public property rights in the 
USA is the Fifth Amendment prohibition on the governmental taking of 
property without compensation.39 Condemnation (or 'taking') of land 
by the government requires payment to the landowner. However, the 
thorny question is whether regulatory limitations on the use of private 
property also require compensation. Because notions of the supremacy 
of private property resonate so well with a traditional Lockean view on 
property, it is tempting to assume such rights always existed in US 
jurisprudential history.40 However, this is not the case. The principle of 
compensation for regulatory loss had little constitutional significance at 
35 L. Oswald, 'Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power' 37 Am. Bus. L] 527, 
536. 
36 Delafons, n. 23 above, at 5 ('[a]n aggressive individualism remains a lively reminder 
that people came to America as a land of opportunity. There is a real antagonism toward 
anyone who presumes to limit a man's right to do as he pleases with his own property'). 
37 T. Dowling, 'Reflections on Urban Sprawl, Smart Growth and the Fifth 
Amendment' (2000) 148 U Pa. L Rev. 873, 887; Oswald, n. 35 above at 537. 
38 See J.L. Oakes, 'Property Rights in Constitutional Analysis Today' in J.W. Ely Jr. 
(ed.), Property Rights in American History (New York and London, 1997), vi, at 146-7. 
Another way of viewing the situation is treating property not as a right but rather as a 
basis for expectation. See C.M. Rose, 'Property as the Keystone Right?' in ibid., at 222. I 
find this position distorted, however, as it places too little emphasis on the inherent rights 
of private ownership and shifts too much to the communal obligation of stewardship to 
the landowner. 
39 US Constitution, Art. V. 40 Oswald, n. 35 above, at 562. 
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the time of the Revolution, and precedents for the takings clause of the 
Fifth Amendment were scant.41 In fact, there were no reported cases of 
its adjudication in Federal Court for nearly the first 100 years after it 
became law in 1791.42 Progressively, though, through application of the 
'affectation doctrine' ,43 then limitation of regulation based on police 
power,44 then broadening of government powers absent arbitrariness,45 
then restricting regulatory power that destroys economic value,46 the US 
courts have struggled mightily to delineate the proper boundary between 
public and private.47 
Despite its inauspicious beginnings and wavering favour with the US 
Supreme Court, advocates of private property rights began to turn the 
political and legal tide in their direction in the late twentieth century. 
After a prolonged period of 'judicial abdication' constitutional protec-
tion of private property and the takings clause took centre stage in sev-
eral decisions.48 The property rights movement counted successes in 
Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Commission, 49 N ollan v. California Coastal 
Commission,50 and Dolan v. Tigard51 as erecting the barrier between 
private property rights and governmental intrusion through regulation. 
In the legislature, Federal property rights legislation was dutifully 
introduced every congressional session in the 1990s, but was never 
enacted.52 On the state level, from 1991 to 1996, twenty-six states enacted 
property rights legislation.53 However, as the decade came to a close the 
movement sputtered out. Although some continued to press the 'hot but-
ton' of property rights,54 and egregious regulatory discretion was cur-
tailed,55 the mantra of property rights had lost nearly all of its legal and 
41 J. Brigham, Property and the Politics of Entitlement (Philadelphia, Penn., 1990) at 
24; W.M. Treanor, 'The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process' (1995) 95 Colum. L Rev. 782, 785. 
42 M.J. Holland, 'Ill-assorted Musings about Regulatory Takings and Constitutional 
Law' (1998) 77 Or. L Rev. 949, 950. 
43 First pronounced in Munn v. Illinois, 94 US 113 (1876), later overruled in Nebbia v. 
New York, 291 US 502 (1934). The affectation doctrine signalled the court's willingness 
to expand the government's right to regulate industry if the public good is affected. 
44 See Lochner v. New York, 198 US 45 (1905) and Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 
us 393 (1922). 
45 See West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937). 
46 Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 US 1003 (1992). 
47 For a more in-depth analysis of this topic see G.C. Poindexter, 'Light Air or 
Manhattanization: Communal Aesthetics in Zoning Central City Real Estate 
Development' (1998) 78 Boston University Law Rev. 445. 
48 Holland, n. 42 above, at 971. 49 505 US 1003 (1992). 
50 483 us 825 (1987). 51 512 us 374 (1994). 
52 Oswald, n. 35 above, at 527. 
53 B.W. Ohm, 'Reforming Land Planning Legislation at the Dawn of the 21st Century 
(2000) 32 Urban Lawyer 181, 188. 
54 P. Salkin, 'Smart Growth at Century's End: The State of the States' (1999) 31 Urb. 
Law. 601, 644. 
55 e.g., in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 US 687 (1999), the Court held 
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most of its political clout. The much-awaited 'higher scrutiny' for land-
use regulation and 'sweeping vindication' of private land rights never 
occurred.56 Whether for political reasons (the Clinton administration), 
ideological change (a move in the country toward a more centrist 
approach to government), or changes in legal thought (a lessening of the 
sharp battle between critical legal studies and law and economics), the 
movement was no longer a driving concern by the end of the century.57 
Going back to what the US Supreme Court stated 165 years ago in 
Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge: 
'[ w ]hile the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not 
forget, that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and 
well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation'.58 
Although new constitutional standards, such as the rough proportional-
ity test in Dolan, did appear to signal an eagerness on the part of the 
Court to cut back on the importance of community rights, subsequent 
decisions (such as Del Monte Dunes) dispelled this impression by limit-
ing application of the new test only in the case of exactions.59 Land-use 
regulation, despite attacks from the property rights movement, continues 
to contain a significant component of the right of the public in private 
property. In this respect US law has worked to prevent (or at least not 
facilitate) the idolatry of land. While retaining the boundary between 
public and private, 60 land-use law in the USA has respected the porous 
nature of the line. The ramifications of individual decisions may seep 
through the line and affect those outside the decision-making circle. But 
the rights of the community still limit individual choice. 
This jurisprudential back and forth demonstrates that property rights 
do not and cannot exist in a void-untouched and unbounded. Property 
56 For a property rights view contemporaneous with the Lucas decision see S.J. Eagle 
and W.H. Mellor III, 'Regulatory Takings after the Supreme Court's 1991-92 Term: An 
Evolving Return to Property Rights' (1992) 29 Cal. W L Rev. 209,210,236; for a more 
recent assessment see Bolick, n. 34 above. 
57 See Holland, n. 42 above, at 972 for reasons why the movement gained momentum 
in earlier years. See also J. Walter, 'The Property Rights Bust', Governing Magazine, 
June 1999, 38 (noting that the private property rights laws passed in the mid-1990s have 
turned out to have little impact); V. Sutton, 'Constitutional Taking Doctrine-Did Lucas 
Really Make a Difference?' (2001) 18 Pace Envtl. L Rev. 505 (questioning the impact of 
the property rights movement). 
58 Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 US 420 
(1837). 
59 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, n. 55 above, at 1635 
60 See C. Reich, 'The New Property' in Ely (ed.), n. 38 above, at 771: '[p]roperty is a 
legal institution the essence of which is the creation and protection of certain private 
rights in wealth of any kind. The institution performs many different functions. One of 
these functions is to draw a boundary between public and private power. Property draws 
a circle around the activities of each private individual or organization. With that circle, 
the owner has a greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must justify or 
explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is master, and the state must 
explain and justify any interference'. 
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rights are aggregates of correlative rights and responsibilities.61 Although 
the rhetoric of the property rights movement resounds with what others 
have termed a heroic autonomy,62 hegemony of this heroic autonomy 
fails to recognize that property rights are built upon a social construct 
depending upon the cooperation of others. Respect for this social struc-
ture keeps the covenant of the gift of land. As with zoning, idolatry will 
take hold in the absence of outside, community-based interest in private 
property. 
Sprawl 
A discussion of sprawl ties together zoning and private property rights. 
As suburbanization accelerated in the USA in the late 1950s and early 
1960s, so did the disdain of the planning community for what it termed 
'sprawl'. 63 In 1970, for the first time, suburban residents outnumbered 
city residents in metropolitan areas of the United States. 64 In 1999 over 60 
per cent of the housing units in the US metropolitan areas were located 
in the suburbs.65 The suburban century66 is under way. 
Land consumption even outpaced suburbanization. According to a 
2000 GAO (Government Accounting Office) study, between 1970 and 
1990 the amount of developed land in metropolitan areas grew by 75 per 
cent while the population grew by 31 per cent.67 This mismatch is what 
contributes to sprawl. Loosely defined, sprawl is uncontrolled and 
unplanned suburban and ex-urban growth that devours free space fur-
ther and further from the city centre, changing meadows into housing 
developments and farmland to strip malls. Sprawl takes advantage of the 
lack of regional zoning to orchestrate growth, and relies on private prop-
erty rights incentives in developing vacant land. 
As suburban development burgeoned over the years, planners, subur-
ban residents and environmentalists joined together under the umbrella 
of 'smart growth'68 to limit further sprawl. The morally attractive 
61 Oakes, n. 38 above. 62 Rose, n. 38 above, at 257. 
63 Sprawl as a planning term did not enter the literature until the late 1950s or early 
1960s. See R. Burchell and N. Shad, 'The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in the United 
States' (1999) 5 Hastings WNW] Envtl. L & Pol'y 137, 140. 
64 1970 Census of Population, vol. 1, table 34. 
65 Of the 218,606,870 people living in metropolitan areas, 136,348,919 lived outside 
the city centre. See Metropolitan Area and Central City Estimates for 1 July 1999 (release 
date Oct. 2000), US Census. 
66 William Schneider, 'The Suburban Century Begins', The Atlantic, July 1992, at 33. 
67 
'Community Development: Local Growth Issues-Federal Opportunities and 
Challenges', United States General Accounting Office Report, 6 Sept. 2000, 80. 
68 Smart growth is an initiative of the American Planning Association, the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Henry M. Jackson Foundation, 
the National Resource Defense Council, and the Surface Transportation Policy Project. 
There is a 'tool kit' for policy-makers that attempts to promote growth that is compact, 
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arguments of the environmentalists and planners (preservation of green 
space, lowering dependence on automobile use, etc.) 69 mask the some-
what selfish motivations that may be ascribed to suburbanites. Why 
might suburban homeowners work feverishly to stop sprawl?70 
Considering that most Americans live in what once may have been con-
sidered sprawl, this fight is about pitting the 'we got ourses' against the 
'we want some toos' .71 Once people move to the suburbs they eagerly roll 
up the welcome mat and work to prevent burdens associated with other 
people following their lead.72 Suburban residents, while mimicking the 
mantra of environmentalism, are motivated by preserving the way of life 
they bought into when they moved to the suburbs rather than by more 
altruistic reasons.73 They do not treasure the farm down the road sine 
qua non. Rather they loathe the notion of sharing the roads, schools, and 
grocery stores with the newly arrived residents who bought houses on the 
subdivided former farmland. 
The definition and existence of sprawl lie in the eye of the beholder. 
Although the issue of sprawl has been raised outside the United States,74 
forums and in the market place: see Burchell and Shad, n. 63 above, 159. For examples of 
state initiatives of smart growth see P. Salkin, 'Smart Growth at Century's End: The State 
of the States' (1999) 31 Urban Lawyer 601. 
69 On the other hand some assign a more venal motive to the environmentalists. Some 
'view anti-sprawl initiatives as reflecting political opportunism and anti car and anti sub-
urb animus rather than actual societal need': W. Buzbee, 'Urban Sprawl, Federalism and 
the Problem of Institutional Complexity' (1999) 68 Fordham L Rev. 57, 60. 
70 Some commentators question the willingness of suburban landowners actively to 
fight sprawl: '[l]itt!e reason exists, however, to anticipate that citizens will invest heavily 
in sprawl correcting policy. For most citizens, the cost of such political participation 
would quickly exceed the costs of suffering ill associated with sprawl': W. Buzbee, 
'Sprawl's Political Economy and the Case for a Metropolitan Green Space Initiative' 
(2000) 32 Urban Lawyer 367, 374. 
71 M.A. Wolf, 'Environmental Law Slogans for the New Millennium' (2000) 30 
Environmental Law Reporter 10283, 10284. 
72 Bolick, n. 34 above, at 863. 
73 To test this hypothesis think about how many protestors of a proposed develop-
ment do NOT live in close proximity. If environmental motivations were the true under-
pinning of activism the demonstrators should be willing to protest regionally, statewide, 
even nationally. As some commentators noted: '[i]n sum the majority of the American 
public is not unhappy with the current pattern of development in metropolitan areas-it 
simply can no longer afford it. Thus, the primary concern about sprawl development, at 
a time when the average American is satisfied with its outcome, is cost.': Burchell and 
Shad, n. 63 above. 
74 e.g. in Seoul municipal build-up increased 54% and agricultural land declined by 
over 58% between 1979 and 1991. See K.G. Kim, 'Flood Hazard in Seoul: A Preliminary 
Assessment' in J.K. Mitchell (ed.), Crucibles of Hazard: Mega-cities and Disasters in 
Transition (Tokyo, New York, 1999) at 98. Mexico City has become a paradigm of 'fast 
anarchic urban growth during the second half of the twentieth century': S. Puente, Social 
Vulnerability to Disasters in Mexico City: An Assessment Method (Tokyo, New York 
1999) at 298. Sprawl is the dominant characteristic for the Japanese cities of Tokyo, Osaka 
and Nagoya. See A. Sorensen, 'Land Readjustment, Urban Planning, and Urban Sprawl in 
the Tokyo Metropolitan Area', Urban Studies, (1999) 36, 2333, 2334. Officials decry the 
declining quality of life in London due to sprawl. See D.J. Parker, Disaster Response 
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low density, one of the intrinsic characteristics of sprawl, is contextual.75 
The aspiration to the isolated house as the 'American middle-class 
ideal' ,76 combined with the 'prairie psychology'77 that comes with the 
confidence that land supply is unbounded, has produced a sense of enti-
tlement to a four-bedroom, 2.5-bath, centre-hall colonial house on a one-
acre tract of suburban land. This is not sprawl-this is the American way. 
Leaving aside the political78 and economic79 impetus pushing residents 
into the suburbs, the search for idolatry forces the focus back on the 
importance of land ownership as underpinning the shift to suburban 
living. 80 Suburbanization is the revealed preference on the part of the 
American consumer. 81 While certainly not ignoring the role of govern-
mental intervention in promoting or shaping this private preference, 82 
America's preference for the suburbs cannot simply be an artefact of pub-
lic subsidy. Suburbanization occurred long before the 'usual suspects' 83 
of governmental intervention appeared. 84 The laws and subsidies may 
have provided a substantial push, but the pull of consumer demand is 
what feeds the drive to populate ever-widening reaches of the major 
metropolitan areas. 
Perhaps it is the desire to be surrounded by grass, trees, flowers-all in 
a controlled setting of course. Americans have a love affair with their 
suburban lawns. '[I]f we look below the surface, our love of lawn is more 
in London: A Case of Learning Constrained by History and Experience (Tokyo, New 
York, 1999) at 197. 
75 US population density is far lower than that of comparative countries in Europe and 
Asia. See United Nations World Population, 1998 (United Nations Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, www.undp.org/popin/wdtrends/p98/hp98awld.htm 
(visited 1 July 2001). See also Burchell and Shad, n. 63 above, 140 ('[d]ensities in the US 
overall are roughly one tenth what they are in Western Europe; in turn, Western 
European density is much lower than that of Japan and only a fraction of what is found 
in such location as Hong Kong and Indonesia'). 
76 K. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier (Oxford, 1985) at 52. 
77 Delafons, n. 23 above, at 4. 
78 e.g. the federal subsidy inherent in highway planning and income tax benefits. For 
a more in-depth discussion see Jackson, n. 76 above, at 292££.; Buzbee, n. 69 above, at 
109. 
79 e.g. the Tiebout hypothesis that citizens look for the community that best meets 
their appetite for taxes and services: C. Tiebout, 'A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures', 
J Pol. Econ., (1956) 64,416,418. See also G.C. Poindexter, 'Towards a Legal Framework 
for Regional Redistribution of Poverty Related Expenses' (1995) 47 Washington Univ.]. 
of Urban and Contemporary Law 3, 10. 
80 Of course one can own land within a city. One can even own real property without 
owning land (a condominium). However, it is a cultural phenomenon to aspire to a house 
surrounded by land. 
81 For a discussion of the suburbs as revealed consumer preference see Poindexter, 
n. 21 above, at 612££. See also Buzbee, n. 70 above, at 369. 
82 Buzbee, n. 69 above, 66. 
83 Highways, interest deductions for home mortgages, redlining. 
84 American suburbs can be traced to the mid-19th century: F .H. Bormann, 
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complicated. It involves aesthetics, economics, psychology, and especially 
history.' 85 The lawn, carrying the English connotations of nature with it, 
became a symbol of prestige in the nineteenth-century suburbs.86 With 
the advent of the lawnmower in 1830, a well-manicured lawn was avail-
able to the masses. 87 Today, the suburban lawn has been accused of being 
both a social and maintenance tyrant. 88 It demands adherence to metic-
ulous care regimes to avoid becoming the neighbourhood pariah with 
unkempt grass. It encourages the deification of the ride-on mower. 
The maniacal attention to lawn along with the 'fenceless state'89 of 
suburbia can be used as a metaphor for the tension between the individ-
ual right to private property and the social interconnectedness of all 
property. It begs the question: who owns your front lawn-you or your 
neighbourhood? This same question can be posed in discussing sprawl. 
If we scrape aside the environmental arguments (which, in large part, 
constitute entrepreneurial politics90), the sprawl discussion is about 
whether private land rights (to subdivide and sell at will) will triumph 
over communal interest of present residents to maintain the status quo. It 
appears to be the same public/private argument that emerges in most reg-
ulatory analyses where the public interest is the communal good. 
There is an interesting twist to this discussion, though. Superficially 
current suburbanites march under the banner of the public good of green 
space preservation. In truth they are more interested in protecting their 
own private rights, which they construe as a right not only in their fee-
owned property but also a right to community status quo. The public 
interest has been privatized. The notion of land as a communal good has 
been warped to limit the use of the good only to those presently in con-
trol. This eviscerates the neighbourliness aspect and reduces the argu-
85 Redesigning the American Lawn, n. 84 above, at 9. 
86 Ibid., at 22. 
87 The lawnmower was invented in 1830 by an Englishman named Edwin Budding: 
F.E.H. Schroeder, Front Yard America (Bowling Green, Ohio, 1993) at 45; Bormann, 
Balmori, Geballe, n. 84 above, at 23. 
88 See Schroeder, n. 87 above, at 124 ('American lawns are tyrannical in two ways, 
social tyranny and maintenance tyranny'). See also Bormann, Balmori, Geballe, n. 84 
above at 6 ('[t]he well kept front lawns roll down the street providing open space and 
beautiful vistas. In this ideal, the grass sward is as pure as possible, mowed two inches 
high, and free from dandelions and other insidious intruders'). 
89 Schroeder, n. 87 above, at 99 (the fenceless state of American suburbs did not 
appear until after 1870). Contrast this with the invention of the sunken fence in Europe 
about 1690. The sunken fence (a deep trench between properties) allowed a vista to the 
horizon unimpeded by fences but kept livestock from roaming. See Bormann, Balmori, 
Geballe, n. 84 above, at 15. 
90 A disaster or crisis (real or perceived) encourages politicians to engage in 'entrepre-
neurial politics' and ride the issue for their own political gain. For a more in-depth dis-
cussion see Buzbee, n. 69 above, at 130. See also Wolf, n. 71 above, 10283, 10286 ('[w]ith 
this new acceptance of environmental ideals comes a new political figure-the instant 
environmental activist'). 
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ment to a battle between competing private interests. The public interest 
of the wider community is relegated to the silent sidelines because it has 
no voice due to the circumscribed locality of zoning decisions. 
The privatization of public good introduces the deity of Open Space. 
Legally speaking the deity of Open Space is a paradoxical god. Landowners 
not only want control over the use of their own land but also want control 
over the use of adjoining property. This expands our notion of what is prop-
erty to include what I call 'communal private property'. A cousin to nui-
sance,91 communal private property permits control by an affected 
community to prohibit actions that would alter a communal way of life. 
This notion hits two opposite walls. First of all, what may be commu-
nal private property to the rest of the area's landowners is an infringe-
ment of someone's right to use his or her own private property. This 
outside control on private property may be condoned with a nod towards 
the importance of community good at the expense of private gain. 
However, the idea of communal private property falters at the other end 
of the spectrum, where the rights of the wider community reside. When 
the definition of community is limited to present neighbours, it ignores 
the needs and rights of those who wish to purchase land but are kept out. 
This limitation is not so easily dismissed because the covenant of neigh-
bourliness must include others outside the present community.92 
When neighbourliness becomes an exclusive (rather than inclusive) 
term, the conflict with the biblical imperative surfaces. This tension high-
lights a flaw in US land-use law: what to do with land that is not needed 
for a purely public use (such as a park) but nonetheless should be pro-
tected from development.93 Although there are various theories of how to 
value public good expressed as an exaction on development,94 public 
good in the sprawl discussion is inflated by the value attributable to com-
munal private property. Therefore, attempting, for example, to recapture 
this inflated public value through a land tax for converting farmland to 
other uses produces an imperfect fit. 95 
91 Giving one property owner the right to enjoin actions offsite that cause harm or 
damage to his/her property. 
92 This goes back to the biblical imperative that land is a gift that must be shared. The 
task for the landed is care for the brother and sister (characterized as the poor, the 
stranger, the sojourner, the widow, and orphan, and the Levite). 'This diverse list has one 
feature of community. They are those who have no standing ground in the community. 
They are without land and so without power and consequently without dignity': 
Brueggemann, n. 13 above, at 65. 
93 For a comparison of UK and US law on this topic see Delafons, n. 23 above, at 95. 
94 e.g. Dolan v. Tigard 114 S. Ct. 2309 (1994) imposes a 'rough proportionality' test. 
For a discussion of alternative valuation see D.T. Kendall and J.E. Ryan, '"Paying" for 
the Change: Using Eminent Domain to Secure Exactions and Sidestep Nollan and Dolan' 
(1995) 81 Va. L Rev. 1801. 
95 New Jersey, Maryland, and Connecticut were among the first states to pass use 
value preferences for taxing farmland. See J. Brigham, Property and the Politics of 
Entitlement (Philadelphia, Penn., 1990) at 47. 
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These types of attempts are imperfect because they impose a cost on 
the wrong side of the ledger. The flaw exists because we have not found a 
way to place a value on what is being lost through the imperative of 
neighbourliness. The value of sharing is not embodied in the land subject 
to regulation. It is not to be found in the increased value when a piece of 
land is converted from farmland to residential. Nor is it the value of truly 
public goods. Rather, it is the value embedded in the property of the 
existing landowners who bought land in reliance upon maintenance of 
the status quo, i.e. the endowment effect. Present landowners value the 
loss of open space more than prospective landowners value the gain of 
purchasing developed land.96 It is this endowment value that is lost in the 
quest for neighbourliness. 
As the anti-growth jargon continues to shift to a more euphemistic 
'smart growth'97 or 'liveable community'98 campaign, suburban land-
owners confuse their endowment value in maintaining the status quo 
with the communal imperative that land is a gift to be shared. To fit the 
anti-sprawl movement into the idolatry framework, true public interest 
(such as environmentalism that benefits the wider society) must be sepa-
rated from a communal private interest that benefits only a select few. For 
example, permitting higher density use (such as cluster housing and 
neo-traditional development) retains more open space than traditional 
low-density use, while at the same time not stopping all growth. This 
serves the public good of environmentalism, willingly sacrificing the 
endowment value of communal private property. 
Conclusion 
Mitchell asserts that 'space is a practiced [sic] place, a site activated by 
movements, actions, narratives and signs' .99 Land is likewise a practiced 
place. It is activated by social interaction, cultural significance of place-
based identity, and by law. Idolatry flourishes when the law fails to cham-
pion the rights of the community. However, given the historical and 
societal importance of private ownership of land it would be a mistake to 
underestimate the central role private property plays. 
96 C.R. Sunstein, 'Human Behavior and the Law of Work' (2001) 87 Va. L Rev. 205, 
221; see also G.C. Poindexter, 'Light, Air or Manhattanization' (1998) 78 BU Law Rev. 
445, 500 (the endowment effect is the difference between an owner's bid price and an 
owner's asking price); Buzbee, n. 69 above, at 106 ('[a]ctual psychological research 
reveals that people are generally risk averse and value what they have against loss more 
than they value similar potential gains'). 
97 See Wolf, n. 71 above, at 10283 (contending that 'if it were truth in advertising it 
would be smart anti-growth'). 
98 See B.W. Ohm, 'Reforming Land Planning Legislation at the Dawn of the 21st 
Century' (2000) 32 Urban Lawyer 181,205. 
99 W .J. T. Mitchell, 'Holy Landscape: Israel, Palestine, and the American Wilderness', 
Critical Inquiry, (2000) 26, 193, 198 (quoting Michel de Certeau). 
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Not surprisingly, balance is the key. The concepts of power (through 
control) and gift (through neighbourliness) hang in the balance. These 
seemingly single, separate notions intertwine in the US legal system in a 
complex way. Notwithstanding the complexity both concepts must be 
given due respect to ensure that private rights are respected, but only to 
the point that recognition of the common good restricts idolatry. 
The answer to this dilemma will be to encourage private rights up to 
the point of suborning idolatry. Any point less fails to recognize the 
quasi-religious attachment to land in the USA. Any point further threat-
ens to strip away the covenant of land as a gift to be shared. Land own-
ership in the United States is more than a legal right; it is a social 
obligation. 
